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PRINCIPLES OF BAILMENT
WILLIAM KING LAIDLAW*

It has been both affirmed and denied that hard cases make bad
law. It will perhaps be admitted that hard cases make difficult yet
fascinating law. As they often contain novel questions, they frequently make new law, not only because the case itself is new, but
also because the case opens a new channel which may be enlarged by
later decisions. Probably no other reason is needed to justify the
examination of cases which might otherwise be considered unimportant.
In making such an examination, it must be kept in mind that defining and classifying is not an end in itself. It is a way to better
understanding by which the rights and duties of persons can be determined with an ease and accuracy otherwise unattainable. It is a
matter of convenience and utility if made correctly and with regard
for all the facts; it is positively harmful if not so made. It will not
do to force the facts of a new case into a classification made from
former cases. If the case does not naturally fit into the classification,
the classification is wrong and should be altered. Moreover, even a
classification which holds nearly all the cases is unsatisfactory if there
are still some that will not fit into it.
In the field of bailments the common and usual cases have controlled the terminology and classification to such an extent that the
less usual cases have with difficulty retained their standing as cases
of bailment. It has been said that "to adjust the definition to a
minor group of transactions, the finding of lost goods and the deposit
by natural forces on another's property, is to classify a large group
by the characteristics of a few of its members. ..

."

The endeavor

should be to find the element common to all members of the large
group and to disclose the trunk upon which perhaps several varieties
are borne.
.Itis proposed in this paper that some of the statements frequently
made about bailment be examined in the light of decided cases with
a view to the discovery of the true elements of bailment; further,
that the position of the unusual cases of bailment be considered, and
that an attempt be made to discover something about the creation
and extent of the duty of the bailee.
*Professor of Law, University of Buffalo Law School.
'Cullen, The Definition of a Bailment (1926) ii ST. Louis L.

REV. 257, 264.
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I
The antithesis of terminology and decision.
A. Although it is frequently said that bailment is founded upon
contract, the actual decisions show that it is not so founded.
Although a bailment usually is created by a contract, it is not
necessarily always so created; 2 nor, indeed, is even mutual consent
to the relationship a requisite. Finding and taking into possession
was early treated as a case of bailment,3 yet there is no true consent
to anything on the part of the loser. His consent and request could
be supplied only by the baldest sort of a fiction.4 The courts of the
nineteenth century, obsessed by the idea of contract, frequently
required that there be a contract where none should have been
required. Usually they did not scruple to "imply" promises from
nothing whatever in order to meet their own excessive requirement.
The broad ground was that "the law always implies an agreement
to do what a man's legal duty requires him to do."' In this way even
an instance of finding could be treated as a case of contract. The fact
remained that it was not a case of contract, but was merely being
treated as if it were.
Sometimes, however, the courts, after having needlessly created
the requirement that there be a contract to found the bailment upon,
were unkind enough pot to "imply" the contract. At best the promise was a fiction which could have been avoided, and a fiction, even
if it is supposed -to be understood to be nothing more than a fiction,
is an unnecessary obstacle to those who teach and those who learn.
Sir W. S. Gilbert made Tomasso say, "It is a legal fiction, and a legal
fiction is a solemn thing."5 He might have added that courts were
solemn things, too; sometimes so solemn that, like the tellers of all
good stories, they come to believe their own ficti6ns. In this'possibility lurks grave danger.
Cases are numerous in which the lack of a contract is alleged as a
ground for deciding that no bailment existed. Some of them have
been decided since the relation of the doctrine of undertaking to
bailment was explained by Joseph H. Beale, jr., forty years ago. 7 Yet
the persistence of the false notion that there can not be a bailment
2
Costello v. Ten Eyck, 86 Mich. 348, 49 N. W. 152 (1891); Foulke v. N. Y.
Consolidated R. R., 228 N. Y. 269, 127 N. E. 237 (1920); Armstrong v. Sisti, 242

N. Y. 440, 152 N. E. 254 (1926).
3
Armory v. Delamirie, i Strange 505 (1722).
4

See Beale, Gratuitous Undertakings (x89I) 5 HARV. L. REV. 222, 224.
Smith v. Nashua & Lowell R. R., 27 N. H. 86,97 (1853).
6
7
GILBERT, THE GONDOLIERS, Act I.
Beale, op. cit. supra note 4.
5
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without a contract may be a sufficient reason for recurring to that
topic. The truth is that the decisions in nearly all the cases which are
placed upon the ground that there was no contract, can be supported
upon other grounds which have often, but not always, been recognized in the opinions.
For instance, in Bertig v. Norman" the plaintiff tried to show that
the defendant had become the bailee of cotton belonging to the plaintiff so that he was responsible for its disappearance. The cotton at
one time stood, with plaintiff's c6nsent, upon a public platform.
The defendant certainly did not then have possession of it. Later
the defendant marked it so as to show its weight, and did other things
which might have been relied upon as constituting a taking of possession had it not also appeared that the acts were in accord with
local customs of trade and did not indicate any intent on the part of
the defendant to take possession or to exclude others from possession.
The vital requirement of possession by the bailee was lacking, therefore, so there was no bailment. The court, however, defeated the
plaintiff because it found no "contract."
In Bohannon v. Springfield9 it was not shown that the alleged bailee
knew that he had the goods of another in his possession, so it is reasonable to suppose that he owed no 6ne a duty in respect to the goods.
As to this point, more will be said later. Furthermore, if the alleged
bailee had owed a duty, it would not have been owed as a bailee, for
he was a servant and had no possession because possession was in his
master.'0
In Cowen v. Pressprich"it was said, as in the other cases now being
discussed, that there was no bailment because there was no contract.
If it had been held that there was a bailment, the result in the defendant's favor would have been the same for he had done all that the
law required a bailee to do under the circumstances, as will appear
hereafter.
sioi Ark. 75, 141 S. W.

201 (1911).

99 Ala. 789 (1846).
"0A. T. L. R. R. v. Baker, xi8 Ga. 809, 45 S. E. 673 (19o3); Tuthill v. Wheeler,
6 Barb. 362 (N. Y. 1849); DoBIE, BAILMENTS & CARMERS (1914) § iO. Accordingly in Moore & Co. v. State of Maryland, 47 Md. 467 (877), in which the
plaintiff sought to hold the state as a bailee, it was decided that the public official
was not a mere servant so that the state did not have possession through its servant and was not a bailee. The official, not being a servant, was himself the
bailee.
n20 2 App. Div. 796, 196 N. Y. Supp. 921 ( st Dept. 1922), reversing the judgment below on the dissenting opinion of Lehman, J., 117 Misc. 663, 676, 192
N. Y. Supp. 242, 249 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
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In Wechser v. PickardImporting Co.1 2 the alleged bailee, with two
co-tenants, occupied a room. In his absence, one of his co-tenants
received the goods which a swindler had induced the plaintiff to send
to the room in his name. Later the other co-tenant permitted the
swindler to take the goods away. Those are all the facts which the
report shows were relied upon to prove that the defendant had
possession. They seem insufficient. But if he did have possession
and was a bailee, the result would have been the. same, for here also
the defendant had used all the care required by law in making delivery
in a bailment of that type.
These cases were properly decided and would have been so decided
regardless of the court's expression in each that there was no bailment
because there was no contract. Consequently they do not prove
that the law is as they say it is. Perhaps they do not even show that
there is widespread misapprehension as to what the law is; but rather
that there is an unfortunate inaccuracy in the terminology in common
use, a terminology formed for use on the normal bailment created by
contract or at least by agreement and mutual consent, and which is
inadequate and misleading when applied to unusual cases. For instance, when it is said that a bailee is liable for a misdelivery regardless of the amount of care he has used, the statement is accurate if
applied to the ordinary bailment. But when it is used to assist in
deciding a case such as Wechser v. Pickard Importing Co.13 it drives
the court either to saying that there was no bailment, when in truth
there was one, or to an erroneous decision, for the rule of strict liability has no application to such a case. It must be said, however,
that generally the courts have chosen the alternative which led to
confusion rather than the one which led to injustice.
In at least one case, however, it appears that the vain but unnecessary search for a contract did lead to a wrong result.
In Coons v. First National Bank of Philmont 4 action was brought
to recover for damage alleged to have been suffered through the
negligence of the defendant in caring for certain securities which the
plaintiff had deposited in a bank's safe deposit box, whence they were
stolen by burglars. The actual plaintiff had no contract with the
bank; the box had been hired by her father. The court said, "The
relation between a bailor and a bailee is fixed by contract, either express or implied, and the rights and liabilities of the parties must be
determined from the terms of the contract, if express, or, if implied,
under the general principles of law and the surroundings and attend194 Misc. 157, 157 N. Y. Supp. 803 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
2Sxpra note
'228 App. Div. 283, 218 N. Y. Supp. 189 (3d Dept. 1926),

12.
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ant circumstances; but always liability is grounded in contract; one
cannot be made the bailee of another's property without his consent.
...It follows that, if there is no contract between the parties to the
action, there can beno liability resting upon the defendant as bailee."15
Thus the court not only says that there can be no bailment without
the mutual consent of the parties, but it confuses mutual consent or
mere agreement with true contract or a promise to act in the future.
But the principle that "one cannot be made the bailee of another's
property without his consent" does not require that there be a contract, or even that there be a mutual agreement. It means nothing
more than that a person should not have obligations thrust upon him
without reason and ought not to be required to use care toward property when he did not know that he was possessed of it. The first part
of this rule has a parallel in the contract rule that a person can not
ordinarily be subjected to the duty of actively rejecting an offer in
order to escape the obligations flowing from the acceptance of it.
The second part restates the general principle that a person should
not be expected to use care toward a person or thing which he did
not know was in a particular place when he acted. The landowner's
lack of duty to an unsuspected trespasser is a familiar illustration.
In bailments, the whole principle may be stated to be that one is not
subject to any duty of care toward another's property thrust on him
unless he knows that he has it,IS and he does not even then have the
obligations of an ordinary bailee toward it unless he consents to its
being in his possession.
In the Coons case it could scarcely be denied that the bank had
knowledge of the presence of valuables in the box and had consented
to their being there. It may not have known who owned the securities, but there are many cases where identity of the owner is not material, and no intent to hold for a particular person is necessary. In the
case of a finding the bailee holds for an unknown bailor, yet a finder
is not free from duty to care for the article if he takes it into his
possession. Where a person sent money to a bank to be deposited to
his credit and the bank refused so to deposit it, but claimed to hold it
for another person, it was held that the bank, in spite of its intent to
hold for another, became a bailee of the sender of the money.17

It is

unbelievable that a bank is under no duty to use care or is permitted
15
IbW.
16

Krumsky v. Loeser, 37 Misc. 504, 75 N. Y. Supp. 1012 (Sup. Ct. 1902);
Lethbridgev. Phillips, 2 Starkie 478 (x819); Consetino v. Dominion Express Co.,
16 Manitoba L. R. 563 (i9o6).
17Davidson v. Alaska Banking Co., 5 Alaska 683 (1917).
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to use less care than would otherwise be required because it was mistaken as to the identity of the bailor. It is submitted that in Coons v.
FirstNationalBank of Philmont" the court acted under the erroneous
principle that bailment arises from contract or, at least, agreement. 19
But the case may be defended on the ground that the bailee possibly
had not consented to receive into its possession the property of anyone other than that of the other party to the contract (although that
it seems that such contracts are not usually so restricted), and one
can not have the duties of an ordinary bailee thrust upon him without
his consent. As will be pointed out later, that does not mean that
there is no duty whatever, but means merely that the duty to use
care is an extremely slight duty. If the bailee had been informed
that the property of others was to be put in the box and had not dissented, the assent to receive possession would have made the bailee
liable to use the same care toward the daughter's property as it should
have used toward the father's.
Various things help to explain the origin of the false notion that a
bailment was always created by contract, leading frequently to a
vain but unnecessary search for consideration. "But the true reason
for all this talk about consideration for a gratuitous bailment seems
to be forgetfulness of the fact that assumpsit was in origin an action
of tort, and will sometimes lie for one. Assumpsit having become so
intimately bound up with contract, it was perhaps only natural that
consideration should always be sought where that action was used,
and this accounts for some of the very forced definitions of the word.
But to do so was wrong; where assumpsit is delictual no consideration
need be alleged, and we know that actions on bailments sound in
tort ....

20

Cases in which consideration for a gratuitous bailment

has been found are really cases of negligence, cases of delictual liabil2
ity disguised by the form of action."11
B. Delivery of only part of what was contracted to be delivered
does not prevent a bailment of the part delivered.
Voland v. Reed2 has been found carelessly cited as holding that
when the essential parts were missing there was no delivery of a
18Supra note 14.
19Although deposits in safe deposit boxes differ in some important respects from
bailments, the question in the case discussed can be treated as one of bailment.
(1925) io CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 255; (1927) II MINN. L. REv. 440.
20
The learned author of the quotation cited here "Bryant v. Herbert, (1878) 3
C. P. D. 339 and Turner v. Stallibras, (1898) 1 Q. B. 56."
2t
Davidge, Bailment (1925) 41 L. Q. REv. 433, 439.
22164 N. Y. Supp. 19 (Sup. Ct. 1917).

292
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machine so that no bailment was created. In truth no question of
bailment was raised in the case. The holding was that the delivery
did not comply with the terms of the contract, which is quite a
different thing. Certainly there was a bailment of a machine actually
delivered. Probably the defect in delivery according to the terms of
the contract prevented the creation of the kind of bailment contemplated, but that is not the same as saying that there was no bailment
whatever.
C. A bailment may exist so that some of its ordinary consequences
follow although others do not.
Just as a sale or chattel mortgage may be binding between the parties to the contract, although ineffective as to some third persons, so a
bailment may exist between the bailor and bailee although it may
not be a bailment as to third persons. Thus, in In re Shiffertu an
automobile was delivered to a man who later became bankrupt. A
somewhat heterogeneous written agreement purported to create a
trust and a bailment as well as a conditional sale. Apparently the
instrument was not filed, so it did not affect certain third persons.
As to them the title passed to the purchaser, so that title and possession were in the same person and there was no bailment. As to
persons who were affected by the agreement, including the parties
to it, the title did not pass, so possession was in one and title in the
other, and there was a bailment. The statement in the opinion in
that case that the agreement lacked the elements of a bailment must
be understood in connection with the question before the court,
namely, when the purchaser became bankrupt, was his trustee or the
seller entitled to the automobile? Had it been a bailment as to third
persons or creditors, the seller would have been entitled to it. Since
it was a sale as to third persons and creditors, they were entitled to
part of the assets of the deliveree treating him as owner.
D. A bailment is not necessarily terminated by the expiration of
the contract of bailment.
It is often said that a bailment terminates upon the ftilfilment of
the purpose of the bailment, the expiration of the agreed time, and so
forth. These statements, although literally true, may be misleading
if unexplained. When the contract of bailment expires, the bailor
may expressly or impliedly consent to the bailee's still keeping the
chattel. Little evidence is required to show this. If the bailor does
consent, the bailment may continue as before, or may change from
one kind of a bailment to another. Then, depending upon the facts,
the rights and duties of the parties may be altered, but the bailment
2128I

Fed. 284 (E. D. Pa.

1922).
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continues. 4 If, however, the bailor does not consent to the extended
possession, the bailment does come to an end. When the bailee holds
beyond the contract period, possession becomes wrongful and the
obligation becomes "absolute liability." Such a relation can scarcely
be called a bailment.
II
A Considerationof Cases upon the Border of the Field of Bailments.
A recent case, Foulke v. New York Consolidated R. R.,21 says, "Bailment does not necessarily and always, though generally, depend upon
a contractual relation. It is the element of lawful possession, however
created, and duty to account for the thing as the property of another
that creates the bailment, regardless of whether such possession is
based upon contract in the ordinary sense or not." 2
Lawful possession of the property of another is generally admitted
to be one of the requisites of a bailment. This is commonly expressed
by saying that a bailment requires a delivery. This accurately expresses what takes place in the usual cases of bailment; but is not
sufficiently inclusive to describe what occurs in some of the less usual
cases, such as the taking into possession by a finder. The expression
"lawful possession," as conveying the idea of no action by the owner,
is preferable to "delivery" because less misleading. Where a vendor
sells but keeps possession for the vendee, even the bailee does nothing
active in establishing possession.
But are there other requisites of bailment? If so, what are they?
And if other circumstances do concur, what is their effect? It is proposed that the principal cases which fringe the lower border of bailments be examined with these questions in mind.
A. Possession of property taken voluntarily and rightfully, yet
without the consent of the owner.
If a person voluntarily and rightfully takes the goods of another,
yet without the consent of the owner, the voluntary assumption of
possession creates duties on the part of the possessor, making him
subject to the duties of an ordinary gratuitous bailee in caring for the
property. The typical case is that of the finder of lost property.26
There is some authority that the bailee is entitled to be reimbursed
2Edgar v. Pairsell, 184 Mich. 522, 15i N. W. 714 (1915); Young v. Leary, 135
N.25Y. 569, 32 N. E. 607 (1892).
Supra note 2. 2albid. 275, 127 N. E. at 239.
26

Joy v. Crawford, 154 S. W. 357 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); Isaack v. Clark, 2
Bulstr. 3o6 (r61S).
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for his expenses in caring for the property thus taken into possession,
partly because of the analogy to maritime salvage.27 So far as concerns the measure of the finder's duty as .a custodian it is true that
the receipt of a benefit by a bailee takes the bailment out of the class
of gratuitous bailments and subjects the bailee to a duty to use
greater care than is required of a gratuitous bailee, no matter how
small or uncertain the benefit is, 28 but in the case of the finder that
principle has no application. For at most his right is the recovery of
expenses incurred and does not extend to compensation for protection
rendered. He receives no benefit, is merely reimbursed for loss, and
thus remains a gratuitous bailee.
Where the finder did not know who the owner was, it has been
held that the bailee was not absolutely liable for a misdelivery, as in
an ordinary bailment, but was merely required to use reasonable care
under the circumstances. 29 It would not be reasonable to require
more.
Wilson v. McLaughlin30 is an odd case. The defendant, a servant
of Bolles, found a horse straying on the highway near an avenue which
led from the travelled road into the messuage of Bolles. The defendant drove the horse from the highway into an inclosed pasture of
Bolles in order to prevent it from straying upon his master's cultivated land. Bolles, upon learning a day or two later what had been
done, directed the defendant to turn the horse into the highway again.
The defendant obeyed and the horse was never recovered by the
owner. The court said that the plaintiff, the owner, was not complaining in his action of the defendant's taking the horse from the highway into the pasture, but was complaining that he "afterwards violated his trust as a voluntary bailee by returning the horse into the
highway again. But this, it appears to us, was the act of his employer
and not of himself. He could not keep the horse on another man's
land, against the will of such other man. The turning out into the
highway was therefore an act which he could not prevent, and for
which he cannot be held responsible. ...,1

Perhaps the better explanation of the case is that the servant did
not intend to take the horse into his own possession, but intended to
27
Reeder v. Anderson's Administrator, 4 Dana 193 (Ky. 1836); Chase v. Corcoran, IO6 Mass. 386 (187); Amory v. Flyn, ioJohns. 102 (N. Y. 1813). See also
Nicholson v. Chapman, 2 H. B1. 254 (1793). Contra:Watts v. Ward, r Ore. 86

(1854).
28

Newhall v. Paige, io Gray 366 (Mass. x858); Woodruff v. Painter, 150 Pa. St.

91, 24 Atl. 621
29

(1892).

Morris v. Third Ave. R. R., i Daly 202 (N. Y. 1862).
31
30,07 Mass. 587 (1871).
lbid. 590.
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take possession for his master. As he had no authority to do so, and
as his master refused to ratify his'act, no one took possession in the
legal sense. It is obvious that the master did not. The servant
never intended to take possession for himself nor to exclude others
from possession. The case may be understood to show that mere
control is not enough to create a bailment. There must be possession
in the strict legal sense of the word.
If there had actually been a bailment, the bailee could not have so
easily divested himself of possession with impunity. In Ryan. v.
Chown 2 the finder of turkeys took them into her possession but later,
at night, without notifying the owner, whose identity had been discovered, returned them to the place in the highway where they had
been found. It was held that the releasing of the turkeys was under
the circumstances a conversion.
B. Possession without the fault of the bailee after the prior contract of bailment had expired.
This class of cases is illustrated by Smith v. Nashua & Lowell R. R.u
Hides had been shipped over the defendant railroad to Smith, who
unloaded them but did not remove them. The agent of the railroad
repeatedly requested Smith to take them away and some were accordingly removed. Others remaining were injured by water leaking
into one of the sheds.where the agent of the railroad had placed them.
Smith recovered in an action against the railroad based on negligence.
On appeal the judgment was affirmed. The court, after speaking of
the cases of finding, said, "A much more numerous and frequent
class of cases, where the law imposes the duty of a depositary without
any actual contract for that purpose, is where the property of one
person is voluntarily received by another, by delivery of the owner,
for-some different purpose than that of keeping it,.and upon an express or implied agreement of a different kind, which has been answered or performed, and the property remains in the hands of such
party without further agreement. In such cases the law, having regard to the requirements of justice between men, implies a contract
for the keeping of the property, until it shall be restored to the proprietor, or his agent; and the contract thus implied is ordinarily that
of a depositary. The holder is bound to take care of, keep and preserve the property, not for the sake of any benefit to himself, nor upon
any expectation of compensation for his services; but solely for the
34
convenience and accommodation of the owner.
The court added that if there were a right to receive compensation
2-i6o Mich. 204, 125 N. W. 46 (19io).
241bid. 91.
*3Supranote 5.
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ordinary care would be required." After saying that a finder could
avoid all the duties of a bailee by refraining from taking the found
article into his possession, and that he on whose premises the chattel
of another has been casually left might leave it undisturbed or might
move it to a convenient distance and there leave it in a suitable place
for the use of the owner, the opinion continued, "But the party into
whose hands the property of another has come, by virtue of a contract for some other purpose, cannot, when that purpose is accomplished, either leave it where it happens to be, or lay it by and neglect
it, unless that may be fairly inferred from the nature of the contract
to be the intention and understanding of the parties; but he still continues to owe a duty to the owner, remains liable for the care and
custody of the property, until he has delivered it to the owner, or to
his agent, or has placed it in such a situation as may fairly be regarded
as equivalent to a delivery to him.""Although the cases in which an originally voluntary bailee becomes
an unwilling one by the accomplishment of the purpose of the bailment are frequently cases of carriers, there are instances in which the
bailee was not a carrier. They are governed by the same principles.
In such cases, in order to determine what care should be given the
goods under the circumstances, itis important to note that the bailee is
in some cases entitled to compensation for storing the goods.37 Doubtless he would be absolutely liable for misdelivery, for he assumed that
liability when he voluntarily received the goods from the bailor and
there seems to be no sufficient reason for relieving him from it.
Incidentally, one wonders if the extent of the undertaking as the
test of proper care38 can be applied where possession is left over without any new act upon the part of the bailee. If not, it seems that such
a case can be explained satisfactorily only by the theory that the duty
arises from the present relationship of the parties, created partly by
their prior acts and partly by the failure of the bailor to remove his
property from the possession of the bailee.3 9C. Possession transferred by natural forces without fault of the
owner.
In Fosterv. JuniataBridge Co.40 the span of a bridge was deposited
3
6A carrier acting as warehouseman under such circumstances does have a right
to compensation. DOIE, op. cit. supra
note IO,at §147
87
3$Supra note 5, at 92.
Supra note 35.
38
Beale, loc. cit. supra note 4. "It is clear that there is really no contract in the
case, at least, of a gratuitous bailment, but that the rights and liabilities of the
parties
are regulated merely by the bailee's undertaking to hold the property."
3
1See, e.g., POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMmON LAW (1921) 20 el seq.
40z6 Pa. St. 393 (z85i).
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upon a man's land without any fault of the bridge owner. It did
great damage by turning the current so that soil was washed away
from the roots of fruit trees. The landowner made use of parts of the
span in certain of his buildings. This use was held to be conversion
although the parts were not so used until after the owner of the span
had refused to comply with a demand for its removal. There was a
dictum that after notice to the owner of the span the landowner could
have cast the span back into the water.
In Peaslee v. Wadleight41 it was held that the owner of land had the
right to remove from it lumber which was wrongfully upon it, but it
does not appear whether the lumber. came there by the fault of its
owner or otherwise.
It is believed that where chattels.are cast upon land the owner of
the land has the possession of the chattel upon it so that he is a bailee,
for a person in possession of land is taken to have possession of all
that is in or upon it. As long as he is ignorant of the presence of the
chattel, doubtless he owes no duty of care toward it. When he does
discover the presence of the chattel, probably he is under, a duty to
use some care toward it, and whether or not he undertakes to keep or
care for the chattel should have great weight in determining whether
or not he has used proper care under the circumstances. It is not the
possession alone that determines the extent of the duty. Whether
or not the receipt of possession is voluntary is important. Even if
possession has been received involuntarily, the bailee may increase
the care he -must use by exercising control over the chattel.
D. Possession obtained by taking possession rightfully of the
place where the goods are.
I,
Similar to the last class of cases, there is another in which the owner
of goods has them in a certain place and, because of his failure to
take them away, they subsequently come into the possession of another. Where ties were left upon a right of way which reverted to
the original owners of the land, it was held that the owners of the
land were bound to deliver the ties to their owners upon demand. 2
The vendee of a house becomes the bailee of goods left therein by a
tenant, must use care toward them, and has the burden of explaining
their loss.43 The purchaser of a store in which goods have been left
by the former owner has the right to be compensated for storage and
415

N. H. 317 (1831).

J. Moss Tie Co. v. Kreillch, 80 Mo. App. 304 (1899).
4Murphyv. Schwark, 117 Wash. 461, 201 Pac. 757 (1921). SeealsoAscherman
4T.

v. Best, 45 Wis. 262 (1878).
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may by contract have a lien therefor. Even where no lien is created,
the right to compensation is admittedA'
E. Possession by the owner's inadvertently leaving the chattel
in the bailee's possession without the existence of a previous bailment.
Where a passenger inadvertently left a package upon the seat of a
railroad car, it was held that it had come into "the custody and the
potential actual possession of the defendant. It was" the right of the
defendant and its duty to become as to it and its owner a gratuitous
bailee. It was its right and duty to possess and use the care of a
gratuitous bailee for the safe-keeping of the package until the owner
called for it." 6 There was no bailment in this case before the passenger left the car, for he had retained possession until that moment.
F. Possession obtainedby mistake, as by the fraud of a third person.
In another class of cases a person has been induced by a swindler
to transfer the possession of his goods to another person from whom
the swindler gets them by fraud. Cases in which the bailee was under
the obligations of a common carrier at the time of the misdelivery
will not be considered.
In Heugh v. L. 6 N. W. Ry. 47 a bailment to a common carrier was
procured by fraud committed upon the shipper by a third person who
later induced the railway to deliver the goods to him. At the time of
delivery the railway had ceased to be a common carrier of the goods
but had become a warehouseman of them. It was held that under
the circumstances the bailee was not absolutely liable for the misdelivery. It was said, "Their position has been not inaptly described
as that of involuntary bailees; without their own default they found
these goods in their hands, under circumstances in which the character. of carriers under which they received them had ceased...
[M]isdelivery under such circumstances is not, as a matter of law, a
conversion, but ... it is a question of fact for thejury, whether the
48
defendants have exercised reasonable and proper care and caution."
Attention was also called to the shipper's having made the second
fraud possible by having first placed faith in the swindler, a circumstance which would have been unimportant if the railway had been
9
acting as a common carrier at the time of the misdelivery.4
AScheider v. Stone, iii Mich. 396, 69 N. W. 829 (1897).

Preston v. Neale, 12 Gray 222 (Mass. 1858).
4'Foulke
v. N. Y. Consolidated R. R., supra note 2, at
7

274, 127 N. E. at 239.
4 L. R. 5 Ex. Si (1870).
48!,dj- 57.
49Pacific Express Co. v. Shearer, i6o Ill. 215, 43 N. E. 816 (1896); Price v. Oswego & Syracuse Ry., 5o N. Y. 213 (1872). But see Samuel v. Cheney, 135 Mass.
278 (1883).
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Difficulty has been experienced in attempting to reconcile this
case with Hiort v. Bot,50 decided by the same court only four years
later. Induced by the fraud of Grimmett, a broker, the plaintiff
made an invoice of grain to the defendant. Grimmett, by representing to the defendant that the transaction was a mistake, induced
the defendant to assign the order to him. The defendant acted in
good faith, believing that he was correcting the mistake in the way
designated by the owner.
Lord Bramwell thought that the person who had come into possession of the chattel of another in such a case would be justified in
taking reasonable steps to correct the mistake, for it would be unreasonable to warehouse the chattel or to turn it into the street. He
said, "Does he not impliedly authorize you to take reasonable steps
in regard to it- that is, to send it back by a trustworthy person?
And when you say, 'Go and deliver it to the person who sent it,' are
you in any manner converting it to your own use? That may be a
question."'" He seemed to feel that the defendant, although he had
acted in good faith, had exercised a dominion over the plaintiff's
property which was distinctly not reasonable. He pointed out that
the defendant had not sent the order back, but, at Grimmett's request, had indorsed the order to him, which was decidedly dangerous.
Lord Cleasby felt that, as the defendant had received no actual
possession of the goods, he had not been placed in a position of difficulty, as in the case of an ordinary involuntary bailment, so that
he need not, and consequently should not, have acted at all. It was
held that the defendant, by his act, had converted the goods.
In this case the facts were more favorable to the defendant in one
respect than in Heugh v. L. & N. W. Ry., 52 for in that case the defendant had voluntarily accepted the goods at one time, although they
were later left on his unwilling hands. But in Hiort v. Bott' the invoice apparently was thrust into the possession of the defendant
against his will; the only act he is shown to have committed in respect
to it was the act by which he intended to rid himself of the possession
of it in the manner supposed-to have been requested by the owner.
It is believed that the cases can be reconciled. In both the court
seemed to believe that in bailments where the bailee held possession
with a reasonable unwillingness he ought not to be held to absolute
liability for a misdelivery; that the requirement of reasonable care
under the circumstances was strict enough in such cases. In Heugh
v. L. & N. W. Ry.M the jury had found that the defendant had acted
60L.R. 9 Ex. 86 (x874).
uSupra note 47.
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reasonably. In Hiort v. Bott5 the court felt that, as a matter, of law,
the defendant had acted unreasonably. It is submitted, however,
that in Heugh v. L. &I N. W. Ry. 9 the court was too lenient in applying the rule of reasonable care in delivery to a case in which the
bailee was in the beginning a voluntary bailee contracting to deliver.
In Krumsky v. LoeserW the plaintiff was a manufacturer and the
defendant was the proprietor of a large department store. A cheat,
representing himself to be the defendant, ordered a large bill of goods
from the plaintiff, directing that they be delivered to the defendant's
store. The goods were sent by an expressman and were received
under a mistaken assumption that they had been ordered. Before
the mistake was discovered, the swindler telephoned, represented
that he was the plaintiff, said that a package had been delivered to
defendant by mistake, and said that a messenger would be sent for it.
The goods were delivered by the defendant to the messeniger, who
presented a forged order, and were heard of no more. The plaintiff
sued the defendant, claiming that the defendant was a bailee and was
negligent in accepting the goods and in delivering them to a stranger.
The court held that there was no bailment for the familiar but erroneous reason that a bailment must be predicated upon some contractual
relation, express or implied. But the court did say correctly, "Where
one becomes possessed of another's goods by chance or accident, no
bailment obligation will arise unless the possessor is, aware and has
knowledge of the fact that goods have come into his possession which
belong to another." 8
It must be admitted that there could be no bailment obligation
upon the defendant before he became aware that he had the propefty of another in his possession. But when the telephone call was
received, the defendant was made aware of his possession of the
property of another. The court, after recognizing this, said, "If I am
apprised by another that a certain article belonging to him was sent
to me by mistake, am I not justified in assuming, from the very fact
of such party first making me aware of its possession, that he is the
true owner and entitled to its return? Am I obligated or beholden to
the real owner, if I have been deceived, to account for the value of the
article thus secured from me through trick? I think not."5 9 This
language is consistent with the view that there was a bailment requiring the defendant to use care in delivering after his discovery
that he had possession of the goods of another, which duty he had
fulfilled. That the court did not believe that the defendant's duty
5
65Supra note 5o.
6Supra note 47.
USupra note 16.
8J8bid. 505, 75 N. Y. Supp. at 1013.
"Ifbid. 5o 6, 75 N. Y. Supp. at

1014.
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was the same as that of an ordinary gratuitous bailee is shown in the
next sentence of the opinion, "If, however, by any process of reasoning, the duty of a gratuitous bailee could be fastened upon the defendants, then I am of the opinion that, inasmuch as they would only be
chargeable in that case with gross negligence.., they should not be
here held liable." 6 In this opinion also it is mentioned that the
plaintiff himself was imposed upon by the swindler and the feeling
expressed that he was, without, much reason, attempting to transfer
his own loss to another person.
Wechser v. PichardImporting Co.61 has been mentioned above as a
case in which it is doubtful that there was any possession by the person claimed to be bailee. If, however, there was such possession, the'
,case falls in the class now being discussed. The opinion contains the
statement that " [a] bailment must be predicated upon some contractual relation, ' 6 and finds that the defendant was not a bailee.
But it also says, "A gratuitous bailee is liable only for gross negligence, and the facts in this case fall short of establishing that.""
The cases here considered are similar to each other in several respects. The plaintiff is complaining of a misdelivery; he himself, although not necessarily at fault, had been tricked into making a delivery in very much the same way that the defendant had, so he is
not in a strong position when he complains of the defendant's action;
the defendant, if he seemed to consent to become a bailee, did so because he was acting under a mistake; and the act he performed in
respect to the goods he supposed would correct the mistake of the true
owner and would carry out his will. Except in Hiort v. Bott14 the defendant acted reasonably, which is all that ought to be required of
him in making delivery. As,these cases are all cases of misdelivery;
they do not directly show anything about the degree of care which
ought to be used towards the goods themselves, but reasonable care
under the circumstances would be slight care.
G. Possession transferred by fault of the owner, as by his mistake
not induced by a third person.
Cowen v. Pressprich' represents a class of cases which differs from
those last discussed in that the bailor was not imposed upon and the
bailor, if not careless, at least caused his chattel to get into the possession of the supposed bailee. In the case mentioned the action was
brought for the conversion of a bond. The plaintiff was to deliver a
bond to the defendant under a contract of sale of bonds, but by mis6oflj.

6
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62Ibid. 159, 157 N. Y. Supp. at 8o5.
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take plaintiff's servant was given the wrong bond. He slipped it
through a slot intended for such deliveries in defendant's office. The
defendant opened an opaque glass window and handed the bond to
the young man who was in the small vestibule, supposing him to be
the messenger who had brought it, and telling him that a mistake had
been made. The young man was not. the plaintiff's messenger, and
the bond, which was negotiable, was seen no more. The plaintiff obtained a judgment upon the theory that the defendant was a bailee
absolutely liable for a misdelivery. This determination was reversed
on appeal upon the dissenting opinion in the lower court.
Although that opinion said ". . they were not subject to any
trust or obligation as bailees, for a bailment arises only through an
express or implied contract," the next sentence, "They were put in
possession of the bond without any agreement on their part, express
or implied, to accept the deposit of the bond,"6 shows that by contract was meant assent to receipt of possession of another's property.
The opinion also said that an involuntary bailee need not put the
property out of his possession in order to escape the obligations of an
ordinary bailee, but that he might at least take steps to preserve and
care for the property without assuming such an obligation; that a
person becomes liable as an ordinary bailee only when he exercises
some dominion over the chattel, that is, does some act inconsistent
with the complete right of dominion of the real owner and which
would be wrongful unless the possessor had the right to possession,
thus indicating by the act that he accepts the possession which had
been thrust upon him. In this case the defendant's only act was an
attempt to divest himself of possession and did not indicate that he
voluntarily accepted the possession which had been thrust upon him.
The defendant was not, therefore, liable absolutely for a misdelivery
as an ordinary bailee would have been.
It was said, however, "If in making an attempt to return the
goods, which was lawful and proper in itself, the defendants used
means which were not reasonable and proper, and as a result thereof
the goods were lost or misdelivered, the defendants would be liable
for negligence or possibly for conversion .... "7 If it is remembered
that the plaintiff was suing for conversion committed by misdelivery,
it will be seen that the court, although it said an act showing acceptance of possession was necessary to make the possessor absolutely
liable for a misdelivery, did not believe that an acceptance was necessary to require the use of care in making delivery.
6Ibid. 678, 192 N. Y. Supp. at 250.
672 bid. 682, 192 N. Y. Supp. at 252.
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In Houghton v. Lynch 8 goods were delivered to the wrong person
by the plaintiff, the master of a ship. The defendant made no attempt to redeliver or to care for the goods. As the possessor did no
act indicating that he accepted the possession, it was held that he was
under no duty actively to care for the goods.
In Consentino v. Dominion Express Co.69 the plaintiff sent bank
notes by mail to his brother. He used an envelope which he had
taken from the office of the defendant express company. The letter,
because of its insufficient address, was sent to the dead letter office.
There the address of the defendant was seen upon the front of the
envelope, the address of the plaintiff on the back being unobserved.
Consequently the letter was sent by registered mail to the office of the
defendant company, where it was received by a clerk and put upon
the exposed desk of an officer who was absent from his desk at the
time. The letter disappeared. The plaintiff, it was held, was not
entitled to recover from the defendant. This result surely is sustainable upon the ground that the defendant supposed the letter was its
own and did not know that it had the property of another in its
possession. It was pointed out that the plaintiff was at fault in using
the defendant's envelope without cancelling the defendant's name
and address and thus causing the money to come into the possession
of the defendant.
Where, as in these cases, the plaintiff by his own nlistake, not induced by a third person, has directly or indirectly caused his goods to
get into the possession of another person who never assumed charge
of them, the care required toward them would naturally be less than
in the cases in which the plaintiff was deceived into parting with his
goods. Still some care should be used in keeping or delivering them.
Reasonable care under the circumstances would exclude extreme
negligence.
H. Possession by action of trespassing animals.
Where animals have trespassed it has been uniformly held that the
landowner might drive off the trespassing animals.7 0 "It is the nature
of those animals which the common law recognizes as the subject of
ownership to stray, and when straying to do damage by trampling
down and eating crops. At the same timeit is usual and easy to restrain
them."7' Caring for them would be a considerable hardship in some
cases. The risk of loss by their being turned loose was not so great at
69
6813 Minn. 85 (I868).
Supra note 6.
7
Stevens v. Curtis, i8 Pick. 227 (Mass. z836); Wilson v. McLaughlin, 107
Mass. 587 (1871); Cory v.Little, 6 N. H. 213 (1833).
710. W. HOL iES, JR., LECTURES ON THE COMMON LAW (1882) 23.
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the time the cattle cases were decided as it would be now with automobile traffic. It might be argued that the old rule should no longer
be applied in such cases. 72 On the other hand, there is policy in
encouraging the owners of animals to keep them confined.
I. Possession by the voluntary act of the owner without mistake.
In this final class of cases the owner of the property voluntarily,
knowingly, and without mistake, thrusts the possession of his chattel
upon another person who is unwilling to receive possession, and who
in some cases indicates his unwillingness.
In Lethbridge v. Phillips 73 a person, being desirous to show the
defendant a miniature painting belonging to the plaintiff, borrowed
the miniature from the plaintiff and delivered it to a son of the defendand who took it to his father's house. The painting was subsequently
injured by being left too near a stove. The plaintiff sued in special
assumpsit. It was held that the defendant could not be considered
a bailee and the plaintiff was nonsuited.
The report of that case is not perfectly satisfactory in several respects. It does not tell whether or not the plaintiff knew what the
borrower intended to do with the painting and it does not show
whether or not the defendant knew that he had the goods of another
in his possession. The first point has to do with the plaintiff's responsibility for the change of possession having taken place. The
second bears upon the fundamental requirement of care as a bailment
obligation. As has been seen, if the defendant did not know that he
had the goods of another, in his possession, he was under no duty to
use care toward them. Perhaps all that was really decided was that
the plaintiff had not made out his alleged case of special assumpsit.
74
the plaintiff, without the consent of the deIn Howard v. Harris
fendant, sent to him the manuscript of a play. It was not returned
and could not be found. The report says, "Williams, J., held that
there was no case to go to the jury, for the plaintiff had chosen voluntarily to send to the defendant what the defendant had never asked
for, and no duty of any sort or kind was cast upon the defendant with
regard to what was so sent. "74a All that it was necessary to decide
was that the plaintiff had not made out a case by proving the defendant's inability to find or return the play, a conclusion which might
have been attained by other reasoning. It is not certain that the
play ever reached defendant.
72

"Where the continuance of possession involves no great burden, and the discontinuance of it involves almost certain loss or destruction of the property, it
may be doubted whether the bailee would be wholly free from duty " WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS (1920) §1039, n. 29.

7Supra note i6.
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In a recent case, Hope v. Costello,75 the plaintiff, having tired of an
expensive set of furs which she had bought from the defendant, returned them to the defendant in spite of the defendant's- protest.
Defendant stored the furs with her own goods for five years, but they
were not stored so as to protect them from moths by which they were
injured.
The court said, "A constructive bailment arises where the person
having possession of a chattel holds it under such circumstances that
the law imposesupon him the obligation of delivering it to another." 6
Part of the opinion proves that there was no bailment created by contract, but the opinion does not show whether or not the court thought
there was any sort of a bailment. It was held that the instructions
in the nature of a demurrer requested by the defendant should have
been given.,
It seems that the facts brought the case within the court's own
definition of a constructive bailment, and that the result was really a
holding that the bailee had used all the care required under the circumstances. The defendant had refrained from any grossly negligent
positive act, and she was not required to take any action to protect
the goods.
In Weinstein v. Modern Silk Co. 77 there was a similar return of
goods to the place of business of the seller, who put the goods in a
public hall but later took them into possession. When the purchaser
subsequently demanded the goods, some could not be found. It was
possible that the loss occurred while the goods were in the hall. In
an action by the purchaser against the seller, it was assumed that the
defendant's placing the goods off its premises was not an improper
act at the time it was done, that is, before the defendant voluntarily
took the goods into its possession.
Perhaps other cases belong in this class, although they are farther
complicated by questions of agency and of the supposed bailee's ignorance of having possession of the property of another.78
In cases such as these, if the bailee does keep the goods, he is entitled to indemnity, as was held in Leavy v. Kinsella79 where the purchaser of pigs returned .them while the seller was absent from his
home. The court said, "The defendant was placed by the plaintiff's
act in such a condition that he was compelled to care for and feed
78
75222 Mo. App. 187, 297 S. W. 100 (1927).
Ibid.192, 297 S. W. at 1o3.
7717o N. Y. Supp. 529 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
78
Chesley v. Woods, 147 Ill. App. 588 (igog); Fischman v. Sanitary Toilet
Co., 112 Misc. 50o, 182 N. Y. Supp. 8og (Sup. Ct. 1920); Tulane Hotel Co. v.
Holohan, 112 Tenn. 214, 79 S. W. 113 (1904).
7939 Conn. 50 (1872).
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the plaintiff's animals. The defendant is made a bailee, with the
duty of incurring expense, not by his own choice, but by compulsion.
Upon these circumstances the plaintiff is liable upon an implied assumpsit to pay the expense of keeping."80 It was also held that there
was a lien.
When the owner knowingly, voluntarily, and without excuse forces
possession upon another, he has little reason to expect the bailee to
be subject to duties in his favor, but that does not prove that there is
no bailment. Lethbridge v. Phillips,81 as has been pointed out, is of
little value as an authority, even if it really belongs in this class of
cases. Hope v. Costelo8 2 does not show that the bailee need use no
care whatever, and Howard v. Harris,",whatever may have been said
in it, decided nothing more than that in such a case proof of delivery
to the bailee and his failure to return upon demand did not make out
a primafacie case for the bailor.
It is probable that the owner would succeed, even in such cases,
if he showed extreme active negligence on the part of the possessor.
It is assumed in all the cases that the owner does not lose title to the
chattel. The obligation of the possessor to deliver the chattel to the
owner would exist even though the possessor was ignorant that the
chattel of another was in his possession. The existence of that obligation ought to be enough to show the existence of a bailment. But it
does not follow that all the rules governing ordinary bailments should
be applied in such cases.
III
The Creation of the Duty
If there is a bailment whenever there is possession of the chattel of
another coupled with some duty, every possessor who is not an owner
is a bailee, for every possessor who is not the owner is at least under
the duty to surrender the chattel to the owner when a proper demand
is made.
It has been seen that no contract is necessary to create a bailment;
that the mutual consent of bailor and bailee is not necessary; that an
active delivery by the bailor is not necessary, as possession by the
bailee without any action on the part of the bailor is sufficient; and
that a person who has had goods of another thrust into his possession
without his knowledge is under a duty to surrender them to the owner.
If bailment begins where possession of another's goods coupled with
duty begins, the most extreme form of "involuntary bailment" may
properly be termed a bailment. "
8°fbid. at 53.

8Supra note z6.

8Supra note 75. -nSup'a
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Thus as stated in Foulke v. New York ConsolidatedR. R., "It is the
element of lawful possession, however created, and duty to account
for the thing as the property of another that creates a bailment,
regardless of whether such possession is based upon contract in the
ordinary sense or not."8 Other things may be present in the normal
bailment, but they are not essential to the existence of the bailment.
Therefore Williston's definition of a bailment, because of its simplicity, is not only the most convenient but is also the most accurate.
"A bailment may be defined as the rightful possession of goods by
one who is not the owner. ' ' 8
The circumstances accompanying a bailment affect not only the
amount of care to be used toward the chattel, but also other duties of
the bailee.
As to care, the bailee's knowledge or ignorance of his possession of
a chattel of another is important to an extent perhaps not generally
recognized.
What the bailor may reasonably expect of the bailee is important
in ordinary bailments. Where the bailor knows or is led to believe
that the bailee has certain skill or facilities, a use of them is required of
the bailee.86 Where the bailor knows that the goods are likely to be
kept in a certain way which would otherwise be negligent, the bailee's
keeping the goods in that way is not negligent because the bailor did
87
not have reason to expect that they would be kept in a better way.
These rules are tests of what the bailee undertook. The same principle
can be applied to the different classes of involuntary bailments. In
them the bailor would not have reason to expect the bailee to use
much care or skill, but how much he has reason to expect may differ
with the different classes.
It seems that the extent to which the bailor was at fault in creating
the involuntary bailment has an important influence upon the amount
of care which he, as a reasonable person, could expect the bailee to
use. The man whose goods have been washed away and deposited
on the land of another without any fault on his part ought to be able
to require more care from the bailee than the man who was at fault
in letting his goods get away and strand, and much more than the
iSupra note 2, at 275, 127 N. E. at 239.
nWILLIsTON, CONTRACTS, §1032.
86Preston v. Prather, 137 U. S. 6o4,
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man who without excuse walks into the store of another and deposits
a box of expensive furs.
This suggestion is confirmed to some extent by those cases which
hold that whether or not a bailor has a right to go upon the land of a
bailee to recover his chattel depends upon whether or not the bailor
was at fault in allowing the chattel to get there."' There is some
authority, however, denying the right to enter even when the bailor
was totally innocent, but such cases rest upon reasons of public policy
not effecting the validity of the present argument.
The curious case of Siegel v. Spear & Co. 89 has caused discussion as
an interesting but difficult case of contract.9" Possibly it would be
well to approach the case as one of bailment. The plaintiff had purchased furniture from the defendant and had given chattel mortgages
to secure the purchase price. The plaintiff, desiring to move from
the city for a short time, arranged with defendant through its agent
to have defendant store the furniture free of charge. After the agreement to store the furniture had been made, the agent promised to
have the furniture insured. The furniture was sent to the warehouse
of defendant and was destroyed by fire without having been insured.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff
in an action based upon a breach of duty of the defendant to insure
according to the promise.
If the case is considered as one of contract, the difficulty is to find
a detriment to the promisee which was asked for or suffered in return
for the promise to insure. As the promise to insure was made, not
before, but after, the plaintiff's agreement to part with the furniture,
it can scarcely be said that the plaintiff parted with the furniture in
return for the promise to insure. The defendant had not asked for
the parting with the furniture in return for the promise. Those who
defend the case as one of contract must rely on the ground of promissory estoppel.
It would be easier to treat the promise to insure, not as a contract
or promise enforceable because supported by consideration or even
by promissory estoppel in the ordinary sense, but as any other circumstance creating duties in connection with a bailment. If the
88

Newkirk v. Sabler, 9 Barb. 652 (N. Y. 185o); Sheldon v. Sherman, 42 N. Y.
484 (1870); Chambers v. Bedell, 2 W. & S. 225 (Pa. 1841); Foster v. Juniata
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bailee has peculiar facilities for protecting a bailed chattel, he must
use them; if he has peculiar personal ability, he must use it; if the
chattel is of a peculiar nature, he must not disregard it. All the circumstances connected with the bailment are to be considered in
determining whether or not a bailee has acted properly. It is submitted that the promise to insure, even if without contractual effect,
was such,a circumstance. It had an important bearing upon what
would be proper care. It was, indeed, the chief circumstance in this
case, just as in some cases the chief circumstance is the bailee's receipt of compensation, or the bailee's possession of a strong safe, or
his skill in handling horses. Perhaps that is nothing more than saying that it is a question of undertaking and perhaps there is an intimate connection between undertaking and estoppel. This explanation of the case, if admissible, at least avoids doing violence to the
ordinary doctrine of consideration. 9'
If, as is suggested, the bailee in most, if not all cases of involuntary
bailment, is under a duty to use some care toward the chattel, it must
be remembered that this is not "slight care" as defined for a threedegree scale of care, but is reasonable care under the circumstances,
which may be less than "slight care". If it is held that there are three
absolute degrees of care, "slight care" is the minimum; there is no
room in the scale for anything less than such as might be applied
to voluntary bailments. Therefore, if a case was one where "slight"
care could not be required, the easiest way to escape from the difficulty was to say that there was no bailment. Many cases decided before the days of the flexible rule of reasonable care under the circumstances can probably be explained in this way. But if the care
to be used is reasonable care under the circumstances, the law is free
to include within the definition of bailment cases which before have
been bothersome anomalies. If there is care which is less than
what is conventionally known as "slight care", its use can be required where less care should be required than in a voluntary gratuitous bailment. Under the three-degree system, there is no way of
taking care of an involuntary bailment. Under the flexible scale of
reasonable care under the circumstances, an involuntary bailment
can be handled as easily as a voluntary bailment.
Some consequences of bailment do not depend upon such circumstances as those discussed and may follow from an involuntary bailment as well as from a normal one. For instance, the shifting to the
bailee of the burden of going forward with the proof ought not to depend upon the bailor's blameworthiness for having forced possession
"See, e.g., (1923) 32 YArAL.E
L. J. 6o9.
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upon the bailee, but upon the principles which ordinarily govern the
application of the rule "res ipsa loquitur".' So it is not surprising to
find that the possession and the failure to account throws on a landlord the burden of proceeding with the evidence in the case in which
92
goods are left in a house by a tenant who moved out.

The tradition of the legal profession for the last two and a quarter
centuries ought not to be broken. By it a quotation from the opinion
of Lord Holt in Coggs v. Bernard93 is required in every treatment of
bailments. Perhaps the following is appropriate: "I have said thus
much in this case, because it is of great consequence that the law
should be settled on this point; but I don't know whether I may have
settled it, or may not rather have unsettled it. But however that
may happen, I have stirred these points which wiser heads in time
may settle."1'
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Supra note 43.
Ld. Raym. 909 (1703).
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